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VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF
REFUGEES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW*
VIC ULLOM**
There is no greater sorrow on earth than the loss of one's native land.
Euripides, 431 B.C.1
Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13(2)'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
keeps watch over some twenty-two million people that have fled the
world's conflicts.3 To address their plight, UNHCR seeks "durable
solutions," primarily voluntary repatriation4 and resettlement, in that
* This article won the Leonard v.B. Sutton Award at the International Sutton Colloquium
and afforded Mr. Ullom the opportunity to attend a summer lecture serried at the Hague
Academy of International Law, the Netherlands, Summer 2001.
- J.D., May 2001, University of Denver, College of Law; M.A. in International Studies,
2001, University of Denver. Mr. Ullom worked on human rights and refugee issues in the
former Yugoslavia between 1994 and 1998. He currently holds a clerkship for Colorado
Supreme Court Justice Rebecca L. Kourlis. Special thanks are given to Thammy Evans
and Professor Ved Nanda for their thoughtful insight and support throughout the writing
of this paper.
1. UNHCR homepage, at http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited March 4, 2000).
2. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3,
Sess., art 13(2) U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
3. UNHCR by Numbers, at http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/table3.htm (last
visited April 25, 2000). This number includes internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well
as refugees, but does not include the almost two million "returnees," former refugees that
are still under UNHCR's protection.
4. See MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, for the definition of "Repatriation" as used in this paper. ("[Tihe
return of a national by a state either from an overseas part or from another state
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order.' Yet, a refugee's return home is often as complex and difficult as
the reasons underlying the conflict from which she fled. The level of
destruction, the presence of mines, the attitude of neighbors, the state
of the economy, the means of the refugee, the legal environment, the
availability of information and the stability of the peace are all factors
influencing repatriation considerations. Perhaps most important is the
attitude of the receiving government; does it facilitate or hinder return?
The second half of the twentieth century has seen a shift in
international refugee policy. Where population transfers used to be
accepted as a means to settle ethnic conflict, today, forced population
transfers are considered violations of international law.7  Few
international scholars contest that refugees should be allowed to
repatriate to their home countries upon a stable cessation of hostilities.
Still, an obligation on countries to accept back refugees remains
uncodified. No text in the "International Bill of Rights"" specifically
obliges a state to take back its refugees after hostilities. 9 Binding
bilateral agreements on refugee repatriation reference a "right to
return", but do so without invocation of codified authority.'0 Even the
following hostilities or worse.") Note that UNHCR proclaimed 1992 as the "Year of
Voluntary Repatriation." Id. at 3-4.
5. Resettlement includes two subparts: 1) resettlement in the country of refuge, or 2)
resettlement in a third country. See id at 3, n.5. See also UNHCR Mission Statement,
available at httpJ/www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/mission/msl.htm (last visited April 4, 2000).
6. Zieck observes that a preference for voluntary repatriation over resettlement
began to emerge in the text of United Nations General Assembly resolutions during the
1970s and was clear as early as 1983. See ZEICK, supra note 4, at 81. Note that UNHCR
proclaimed 1992 as the "Year of Voluntary Repatriation," which it later extended into a
decade. Id. at 3-4. UNHCR envisions voluntary repatriation as the "best solution." See,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Opening Statement by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at the Forty-fourth Session of Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's Program (October 4, 1993) available at
http://www.unhct.ch/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/4ocl993.htm. See also Conclusion no.
18(XXXI) of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, reprinted in UNHCR
Doc. HCR/IP.2/REV.1982 (1982) at 39-40; Report of the UNHCR to the Economic and
Social Council, UN Doc. E/1985/62 (1985) at 16-17.
7. Eric Rosand, The Right To Return Under International Law Following Mass
Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1120 (1998).
8. The International Bill of Rights comprises the Universal Declaration, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR], and The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
9. But see Ved Nanda, The Right to Movement and Travel Abroad: Some
Observations on the U.N. Deliberations, 1 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 113 (1971)
(noting that "[tihe right to movement and travel ... in the [Universal Declaration] is
fairly comprehensive ... encompass[ing] such diverse groups as tourists, refugees,
immigrants and emigrants and stateless persons .... ) (emphasis added). Professor
Nanda also remarks that the actual practice of this right is "severely restricted." Id.
10. E.g., The language in a March 9, 2000 agreement signed between the new
Minister of Foreign Affairs in Croatia, Tonino Picula, and the President of the Bosnian
Serb entity, Milorad Dodik, with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also present
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Convention on the Status of Refugees, discussed below, operates
primarily on those countries hosting refugees, placing remarkably few
obligations on the country from which the refugees fled. Instead,
Human rights instruments tend to speak of a right to "enter" one's
country rather than "return."" Still, a growing number of international
human rights scholars addressing this subject agree that the right to
"enter," which is present in most human rights instruments, amounts to
a right to "return."2 As individuals, refugees possess the "human right"
to return to the country from which they fled; a right to be guaranteed
by their state."
Human rights instruments operate as obligations upon states
premised at the level of state-to-national. However, another level of
obligation exists, state-to-state, that could also support the obligation.
4
This paper examines that second level by asking whether, in addition to
a duty to protect the human rights of its citizens, states have a
concomitant duty vis-et-vis other states to accept refugee nationals back
home." Stated otherwise, is a country that refuses to repatriate its
nationals after a cessation of hostilities, in addition to violating a
refugee's human rights, also violating Customary International Law
(CIL)?6 May a state simply declare that those who fled hostilities are
no longer its responsibility," or is there something in the "laws of
makes such a reference. The agreement addressed return between those two
governments: "It is confirmed that the right to one's own home and protection of property,
as well as the right to return to one's home, are every man's basic rights. These rights are
defined by relevant international conventions, the General Peace Accord Framework, as
well as by the constitutions of Croatia, the Serb Republic and Bosnia-Hercegovina." See
Appendix 2 for full text of agreement.
11. Examples include: the ICCPR, supra note 8; the Universal Declaration, supra
note 2; and The European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
OSept. 3, 1953 312 U.N.T.S. 222, among others. See also Ilias Bantekas, Repatriation As A
Human Right Under International Law And The Case Of Bosnia, 7 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. &
PRAC. 53.
12. Id. See also Bill Frelick, Refugee Rights: The New Frontier Of Human Rights
Protection, 4 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261 (1998) (arguing that one of UNHCR's
obligation is "restoration of rights," one being the right to return.); John Quigley,
Displaced Palestinians And A Right Of Return, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 171 (1998).
13. See Rosand, supra note 7, at 1117-18 n.103; Bantekas, supra note 11, at 55 n.19.
The author purposefully uses the word "individual" as a somewhat different analysis is
required for mass or group refugee rights.
14. See Quigley, supra note 12, at 194.
15. Violations of customary international law vis-A-vis individuals are quite likely
also human rights violations, but not all human rights violations are violations of
customary law. For example, a state's participation in torture and slavery are violations
of customary law, even jus cogens violations, but violating an individual's human right to
"effective remedy before a court" is not likely a customary international law violation.
16. See LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1989) [hereinafter "CIL"].
17. In this vein, a state may invoke the customary law doctrine, Rebus Sic Stantibus.
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nations" that forbids a state from denying its refugees (re)entry?"8 The
following discussion sets forth the basis for recognizing "Voluntary
repatriation of refugees" as an emerging customary international legal
norm. States refusing to repatriate refugees once a stable peace exists
stand in violation of customary international law.
Part Two of this paper examines the background of the obligation
on countries to accept back their nationals. Throughout history,
conventions, declarations, and treaties have facilitated the formulation
of customary international rules. These instruments are gleaned for
their content relevant to refugee repatriation. Part Two addresses both
general and regional instruments. Part Three undertakes an analysis
of the formation of CIL norms. The examination approaches each of the
accepted elements of CIL formation in turn, applying them to
"voluntary repatriation" as a principle. Part Four contains conclusions
and recommendations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The UN and Other International Instruments
Despite Euripides' lament quoted above, an obligation on
governments to allow individuals entry, in terms of customary norms, is
but a nascent concept. Some customary norms are thousands of years
old. The Magna Carta, passed in 1215, probably contained the first
mention of a "right" to enter ones' own country with the concomitant
obligation on the government to respect that right. In Article 41 of that
document, citizens possessed the freedom "to go out of our kingdom, and
to return, safely and securely, by land or water, saving his allegiance to
us."'9 Note that the right is only qualified by "allegiance."
Last century, the League of Nations addressed a similar question in
its Havana Convention Regarding the Status of Aliens.20  The
Convention spoke of the obligation upon states to "receive their
18. At least two authors have so found. See Quigley, supra note 12, at 194 ("A state's
refusal to admit its national may violate the rights of the state in which the national is
present. The state of nationality bears an obligation toward a state where its absent
national sojourns, because the state of sojourn is entitled to control residence in its
territory by aliens.") (citing Richard Plender, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 71 (1972)
("The proposition that every state must admit its own nationals to its territory is so
widely accepted that it may be described as a commonplace of international law.")).
19. Bantekas, supra note 11, at 54 (citing H. HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND
RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 3-6 (1987)) (noting further "the French
Constitution of 1791 also guaranteed the 'freedom of everyone to go, to stay or to leave,
without being halted or arrested.'").
20. Convention Regarding the Status of Aliens, Havana, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 6, 46 Stat.
2753, 132 L.N.T.S. 301.
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nationals expelled from foreign soil who seek to enter their territory."21
For its part, the United Nations General Assembly ("UNGA") in 1948,
by way of the Universal Declaration, obligated what is now 189 signing
plenipotentiaries to its article 13(2): "Everyone has the right to leave
,,22
any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Immediately following the Universal Declaration, the United Nations
("UN") adopted the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and
in 1951, established the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees.3 These two institutions place the care of refugees squarely
onto the shoulders of UN member states. The Refugee Convention's
definition of "refugee" is pertinent to this discussion:
Article 1
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or
owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,
owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it. 24
Note that since 1967, a protocol is available that removes the
"events occurring before 1 January 1951" restriction.25  For several
years UNHCR's position has been that not only those in fear of
persecution deserve protection, but also those fleeing war-related
conditions.6 The two slightly different definitions of "refugee" have not
been without controversy, especially when the UNHCR considers which
groups deserve protection. The debates focus on whether a particular
21. Convention Regarding the Status of Aliens, Havana, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 6, 46 Stat.
2753, 132 L.N.T.S. 301.
22. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 13(2).
23. See www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/un&ref.htm.
24. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
25. Protocol to the Convention Status of Refugees, art 1(2), 606 U.N.T.S. 267
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) ("For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term
'refugee' shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any
person within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words 'As a result of
events occurring before 1 January 1951 and.. .' and the words '. . . as a result of such
events', in article 1 A (2) were omitted.") To date, 135 countries have signed the protocol,
while 136 countries have signed the Convention itself. See UNHCR webpage, at
http://www.unhcr.cldrefworldlrefworldllegal/instrumelasylum/51engsp.htm (visited Oct.
23, 2000).
26. See UNHCR homepage, at http'//www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/who/whois.htm#war (last
visited Apr. 25, 2000) ("UNHCR considers that persons fleeing war and war-related
conditions, and whose state is unwilling or unable to protect them, are in need of
international protection and should be considered refugees.").
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group comprises "Convention refugees" or not.21
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination or Reduction of
Future Statelessness does not mention any of the words "refugee,"
"return" or "repatriation."2" Nevertheless, this Convention poses
substantial obligations on its signatories regarding the loss of
citizenship and, therefore, the loss of the right to enter. For example,
Article Seven of that convention precludes any loss of citizenship unless
the individual possesses another nationality.29 But note the narrow
exception in paragraph four:
A naturalized person may lose his nationality on account of residence
abroad for a period, not less than seven consecutive years, specified by
the law of the Contracting State concerned if he fails to declare to the
30appropriate authority his intention to retain his nationality.
Under this provision, a naturalized person who later becomes a
refugee may lose his nationality should he stay abroad seven years or
more. 31  But, he need only "declare... his intention to retain his
nationality" and it is so.3 2 In short, signatories to this Convention may
not unilaterally declare that their refugee nationals living abroad, are
no longer their citizens unless that citizen has acquired citizenship of
another country.3 This prohibition is not absolute, but the exceptions
are sufficiently limited so as to reinforce the rule.34 And even if a
government were to make such a declaration, purporting to strip a
former national of citizenship, one prominent scholar wrote as early as
1927 that the citizenship stripping government must still repatriate its
27. For a thorough discussion of this controversy including the arguments for
"Temporary Protected Status" applying to certain non-convention "refugees" see Joan
Fitzpatrick, Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime, 94 AM.J.
INT'L.L. 279 (2000).
28. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 989 U.N.T.S. 175, entered into
force Dec. 13, 1975. Only 24 countries have ratified this convention as of November 1999.
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part-boo/v-boo/v_4.html (last visited
Mar. 3, 2000).
29. Article 7 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 28,
reads:
1. (a) If the law of a Contracting State entails loss or renunciation of
nationality, such renunciation shall not result in loss of nationality unless
the person concerned possesses or acquires another nationality; .... Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. At the time of this writing, only twenty-six countries have signed this convention.
Whether non-signatories may make this unilateral declaration is, in part, beyond the
scope of this paper. An analysis of individual, domestic law of each non-signatory is
required. This paper discusses whether customary obligations place similar restrictions
on a country seeking to keep out its nationals.
34. See Bantekas, supra note 11, at 58-59.
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national."
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights36 (ICCPR)
bound its signatories not to arbitrarily deprive anyone of the right to
enter his own country.37 Despite its clear language, that obligation is
derogable. Article 4(1) of the ICCPR allows countries to avoid the
requirement when faced with a national emergency "threatening the
life" of the nation. " The effect of derogation and its influence on the
formation of CIL is discussed in Section E(iv) below.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, to which 156 countries are party, ensures racial
and ethnic equality with respect to the right to return to one's country.39
In pertinent part, this Convention reads:
[S]tates Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone,
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following
rights:
(ii) The right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to
35. John Fischer Williams, Denationalization, 8 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 61 (1927)
("There will also be general agreement that a state is bound to receive back across its
frontiers any individual who possesses its nationality."); Id. at 56 ("The duty of a state to
receive back its own nationals is laid down by the accepted authorities in the most general
terms and is in accordance with the actual practice of states.").
36. By 1994, 127 countries had ratified the ICCPR. RICHARD LILLICH AND HURST
HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE,
185 (3d ed. 1995).
37. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 12(4) ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country.") See also Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 219 (1993) ("In light of the historical background,
there can be no doubt that the limitation on the right to entry expressed with the word
'arbitrarily'... is to relate exclusively to cases of lawful exile as punishment for a
crime.").
38. ICCPR, supra note 8, at art. 4(1) ("In time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties
to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour,
sex, language, religion or social origin").
39. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishintemetbible/partl/chapterIV/
treaty2.asp.
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40
one's country ....
Widespread ratification of this Convention, beginning in 1966, is no
small evidence of states' acquiescence to international obligations vis-h-
vis the return of their nationals.4 1 While the Convention respects states
using a legal framework to regulate transit across borders, it prohibits
any discriminatory application in the law. A state party may find a
legal mechanism to prohibit a refugee's return, but that mechanism
may not relate to the refugee's ethnic or racial group.
Apart from these conventions, few early UN documents spoke in
terms of repatriation obligations on states; rather, they "urged" states,
or "encouraged" them to "assist. . . in voluntary repatriation."42 Recent
UN language, however, is growing increasingly firm.43 While still
"encouraging" countries to create conditions conducive to return, the
past three years have seen the term "obligation" creep into numerous
resolutions addressing repatriation.4 1 "While UN bodies have not
always made it clear whether they acted on the basis of human rights
law or humanitarian law, language in UN documents indicates that the
nations based their calls for return on the understanding of an
international legal obligation to repatriate." 5 These texts support a
conclusion that states are increasingly under a legal obligation to accept
back their nationals upon the cessation of hostilities.
B. Regional Instruments
Numerous regional human rights conventions include in the list of
protected rights, the right of nationals to enter their countries. No
convention qualifies that right when a national becomes a refugee. For
example, in 1950, the Council of Europe adopted The European
40. Id. art. 5
41. Id.
42. See Bantekas, supra note 11, at n. 35. See generally Donna E. Arzt, Palestinian
Refugees: The Human Dimension of the Middle East Peace Process, PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L
L. 372 (1995) (arguing the use of "should" in UNGA Res. 194 (1948) and the non-use of
"right" implies a lack of obligation). Appendix 1 contains a list of UN texts with language
on point.
43. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1009, U.N. SCOR, 3563' mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1009 (1995)
("[In conformity with internationally recognized standards... respect fully the rights of
the local Serb population including their rights to remain, leave or return in safety...
[and] create conditions conducive to the return of those persons who have left their
homes.").
44. See G.A- Res 54/146, U.N. GAOR, 54' Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/146 (2000)
("Reiterates the right of all persons to return to their country of origin, emphasizes in this
regard the obligation of all States to accept the return of their nationals) (emphasis
added); See also G.A. Res. 53/125, U.N. GAOR, 53' Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/53/125 (1999);
G.A. Res. 52/103, U.N. GAOR, 52' Sess., A/RES/52/103 (1998).
45. Quigley, supra note 12, at 214.
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Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.46 Thirteen
years later, the Council added Protocol No. Four, to wit: "No one shall
be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is
a national."47 Neither the convention nor any of its protocols mentions
the word refugee.4 Like the ICCPR, this convention provides for
derogation in time of emergency."
The American Convention on Human Rights also obligates its
signatories such that "[n]o one can be expelled from the territory of the
state of which he is a national or be deprived of the right to enter it."50
This article, too, is derogable under article 27(1) in emergency
situations." Finally, The African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights provides in Article 12(2) that "[e]very individual shall have the
right to leave any country including his own, and to return to his
country."52 The language is unambiguous, but, like its contemporaries,
this charter allows states to restrict application. The ability of state
parties to derogate certainly weakens these provisions. Still, when
countries face no national emergency, the obligation is unequivocal.
C. Other Instruments
The Geneva Conventions also impose obligations in the area of
repatriation. Operating to protect civilians during wartime, the Fourth
Convention states in Article 134 that "[tihe High Contracting Parties
shall endeavor, upon the close of hostilities or occupation, to ensure the
return of all internees to their last place of residence, or to facilitate
their repatriation. "5' The language obligates parties to "endeavor ... to
46. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 11.
47. Id. Protocol 4, art. 3(2).
48. See supra note 46, Protocols 1 -11.
49. Id. art. 15(1) ("In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law").
50. American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica", Art. 22(5),
9 I.L.M. 673, found at www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.htm.
51. Id. Art. 27(1) ('In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens
the independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its
obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin")
52. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Art. 12(2), OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
53. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Art. 134, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ensure the return . .. " While the language could be interpreted as
requiring repatriation upon the war's end, such a reading implicates
questions of refoulement, an idea repugnant to international law.55 The
Geneva Conventions direct that Actors shall undertake efforts aimed at
repatriation of internees."' The Conventions make no distinction
between host countries and repatriating countries; the obligation rests
on all parties.57
One of the few documents, regional or international, directly
obligating a state to accept back refugees emerged in the Afro-Asian
Legal Consultative Committee.' 8 Its "Principles Concerning Treatment
of Refugees" states in Article IV Right of Return that "A refugee shall
have the right to return if he so chooses to the State of which he is a
national or to the country of his nationality and in this event it shall be
the duty of the State of Country to receive him. 59
In the United States, the Restatement on Foreign Relations makes
no mention whatsoever of return of refugees or repatriation.' ° It briefly
mentions the "right of return" as one of a few "political rights" listed in
the Universal Declaration.6 ' The Restatement does not take a position
on whether this right, or any, of the listed human rights have acquired
CIL status.
Modern cease-fire agreements generally include a provision on
"evacuee" return where relevant.62
Evacuees ... have a legal right to return to their homes at the
conclusion of hostilities and the occupying power who evacuated them
has a duty to transfer them back to their homes. The return of
evacuees is of particular importance because it still may be an issue
during the negotiation of the cease-fire agreement. Accordingly, the
54. For an argument on the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the
Palestinian situation, see Quincy Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, 33
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 5 (1968).
55. Refoulement is the forcible return of refugees to their country of origin. See
Dietrich Schindler, Conference: Neutrality, Morality, And The Holocaust; Neutrality and
Morality: Developments in Switzerland and in the International Community, 14 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 155, 160 (1998). See also, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A
PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 660 (Weston et.al. eds. 1997).
56. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 54.
57. Id.
58. The Committee has official observer status with the United Nations. See U.N.
Doc. AI53/PV.48 (1998).
59. Eighth Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Bangkok
(Thailand) 8-17 August 1966. Reprinted in Refugee Abstracts, Vol. 7, No 2, 1988, pp. 73 -
83 Center for Documentation on Refugees, UNHCR, Geneva (No. 2, June 1988).
60. See generally Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations (1987)
[hereinafter Restatement].
61. Id.
62. Major Vaughn A. Ary, Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions In Cease-
Fire Agreements, 148 MIL. L. REv. 186 (1995).
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cease-fire agreement should contain a provision allowing the voluntary
transfer of these displaced persons home.
In sum, a wealth of international, conventional law imposes
obligations on states to repatriate their refugees. The ability to
derogate offers a country's only potential escape. That limitation aside,
a vast majority of the world's states are currently party to instruments
that compel "a right to enter" or "right to return" obligation, and none of
those instruments suggest refugees are subject to different treatment.
III. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL NORMS:
AN ANALYSIS OF CIL FORMATION
A. A Definition of CIL
The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations contains one of the
most concise definitions of Customary International Law: "Customary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." The
International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has chosen a more thorough
definition. The court analyzes whether a practice is 1) of "norm
creating character;"65 2) whether either sufficient time has passed or the
norm has achieved "a very widespread and representative
participation;"6 3) whether it is "settled state practice;"67 and 4) if it is a
state practice, whether states follow that practice out of opiniojuris sive
necessatatis. Thus, the ICJ adds "norm creating character" and
"passage of time" to the definition contained in the Restatement.
Concerning passage of time, the Restatement's view is that "[tihe
63. Ary, supra note 62, at 210.
64. Restatement, supra note 60 § 102(2). Comment (b) to section 102 explains
"Practice of states," Subsection (2) includes diplomatic acts and instructions as well as
public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy, whether
they are unilateral or undertaken in cooperation with other states, for example in
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). Inaction may constitute state practice, as when a state acquiesces in acts of
another state that affect its legal rights. The practice necessary to create customary law
may be of comparatively short duration, but under Subsection (2) it must be "general and
consistent." A practice can be general even if it is not universally followed; there is no
precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should reflect wide
acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity. Failure of a
significant number of important states to adopt a practice can prevent a principle from
becoming general customary law though it might become "particular customary law" for
the participating states.
65. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 72 (1969) [hereinafter
North Sea].
66. Id. para. 73.
67. Id. para. 75.
68. Id. para. 77.
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practice necessary to create customary law may be of comparatively
short duration. .... "" After a brief discussion on the application of CIL
to individuals, the paper applies the above-recognized elements of CIL
formation to the principle of voluntary repatriation.
B. Customary International Law and Individuals
Today it is generally acknowledged that states have obligations
toward individuals under CIL. One of the earliest recognized customs
among nations offered diplomats a particular level of protection."
Today, both torture and slavery are firmly established violations of
CIL.7 A federal court in the United States held that "disappearances"
and "summary execution or murder" constitute violations of CIL.7" In
all these cases, a state violates the "laws of nations" if it fails to treat
individuals within recognized international norms.
International legal scholars have noted that some codified human
rights norms have reached CIL status. A 1994 report authored by
Richard Lillich and Hurst Hannun, writing for the International Law
Association, remarked that while the Universal Declaration "in toto"
had "insufficient state practice" for acceptance [as CIL], certain of its
provisions did.73  On the issue of UDHR's Article 13, Freedom Of
Movement And The Right To Leave And Return, the report writers
conclude, "there does not seem to be sufficient consensus on this point
at present to draw firm conclusions. " "
Is the Lillich and Hannun report accurate today, or has "consensus
developed" since 1994 such that this provision joins the six other rights
already recognized as CIL? Lillich and Hannun's conclusion is that the
entire Article 13 is inconclusive, but the provision has multiple parts.
Perhaps the "right to enter," standing alone, has achieved CIL status.
69. Restatement supra note 60, § 102(2) comment (b).
70. MAx SORENSON, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (1968)
("International law confers on diplomats immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction by the
receiving state. The principles governing diplomatic immunities are among the most
ancient and universally recognized rules of international law.").
71. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 441 (1999).
72. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988); See also Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (1987).
73. International Law Association, Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights
Law, Final Report on the Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, ILA, Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference 525, (Buenos
Aires 1994) (Lillich and Hannum eds). The report recognizes four provisions in the
Universal Declaration as CIL, 1) equal treatment, 2) prohibition of slavery, torture, and
arbitrary detention, 3) freedom of marriage, and 4) the principle of non-refoulement.
74. Final Report on the Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
National and International Law, ILA, Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference, supra note
73.
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To consider the substance of this proposition, undertaken below is an
application of the elements by which CIL develops.
C. Widespread and Representative State Participation"
Given the large number of General Assembly resolutions calling for
voluntary repatriation in post-conflict areas, a simple conclusion is that
most countries, indeed a comfortable majority, believe in the principle
of voluntary repatriation.7 ' But Assembly resolutions are not indicative
of state practice. Agreeing that another country should repatriate its
refugees is quite different that repatriating one's own refugees. And in
the same way countries without coastlines cannot contribute to the
equidistant principle in continental shelf cases, even if they concur,
countries never having experienced refugee outflows cannot contribute
state practice evidence of a voluntary repatriation principle. 7 Rather,
proper analysis encompasses only those states where violent conflict
occurred, nationals fled as refugees, and a durable cessation of
hostilities reigns to the extent that return is practical. It is in these
states that the existence (or absence) of "widespread state practice" in
voluntary repatriation is best analyzed.78
To focus the discussion, those country situations that the United
Nations, either by its General Assembly, Security Council, or the
UNHCR, acknowledges as fitting the above criteria have been set forth
in Table A below:
79
75. North Sea, supra note 65 para. 73.
76. E.g., AIRES/48/117 para. 4 (1994) ("[the assembly] [rleaffirms its conviction that
the voluntary repatriation of refugees and the return of displaced persons to their
countries or communities of origin continues to be a positive sign of the progress of peace
in the region.").
77. North Sea, supra note 65, para. 73 (referring to "states whose interests are
specially affected").
78. Conflicts which fit the criteria, but pre-date the UN system, are omitted. The
author posits below that the fifty-five years since the UN will satisfy the "passage of
sufficient time" element of CIL formation, and thus analyzing pre-UN conflicts is
unnecessary. However, the author also acknowledges that pre-UN conflicts could also
offer evidence of the norm's existence. Future research may be directed in this area.
Also, research revealed approximately fifteen countries that have less than 500 refugees
awaiting repatriation. For practical purposes, these countries are also omitted from the
discussion.
79. See Appendix 1 for UN documentation in support. The UNHCR recognizes nearly
100 countries from which refugees have fled, approximately half fit the criteria. BOLD
denotes countries where no repatriations are occurring. Asterisk (*) denotes countries
that have re-erupted in violence since the UN sought repatriation. The time period has
been limited to the 1990's with few exceptions.
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Table A
1) Afghanistan 17) Ghana 33) Niger
2) Angola* 18) Guatemala 34) Rwanda
3) Bangladesh 19) Guinea-Bissau 35) Senegal
4) Bhutan 20) Indonesia/East Timor 36) Sierra Leone*
5)Bosnia & 21) Iraq 37) Somalia
Herzegovina
6) Burundi 22) Israel* 38) Sri Lanka*
7) Cambodia 23) Kazakhstan 39)Tajikistan
8) Chad 24) Kenya 40) Togo
9) Congo* 25) Kyrgyzstan 41) Turkey
10) Congo, Dem. 26) Laos 42) Turkmenistan
Rep.*
11) Croatia 27) Liberia 43) Uganda
12) Cyprus 28) Mali 44) Vietnam
13) El Salvador 29) Mauritania 45) Western Sahara
14) Eritrea 30) Myanmar 46) Yugoslavia/Kosovo
15) Ethiopia* 3 1) Namibia
16) Georgia 32) Nicaragua
In these forty-six countries, the UN is cognizant of a refugee
problem but believes that repatriation potential exists. Forty-two of the
forty-six countries allowed voluntary repatriation between 1997 and
1999. Bhutan, Kenya, Israel, and Western Sahara are the four
countries where no return took place despite arguably conducive
conditions. This simple numerical analysis does not account for those
countries where refugees come and go as the fighting waxes and
wanes.8" Yet, countries that allow refugees to return, only to have the
returnees flee again with a new outbreak of hostilities, support state
practice in the area of voluntary repatriation.
Thus, an initial conclusion is that forty-two out of forty-six
countries with refugee situations hosted return over this recent three
year period. Many of these returns occurred pursuant to an agreement
between the host country, UNHCR, and the country of origin. The
three parties sign a common document whereby the receiving country
obligates itself to protect the refugees' return to the extent possible with
UNHCR providing logistical assistance. In other instances, however,
UNHCR simply records the repatriations without assisting.81 Whether
the countries chose to repatriate out of a sense of legal obligation, or for
some other motive, is the subject of the next section.
80. E.g., Angola, Sudan, and most recently, Israel.
81. See http://www.unhcr.ch/statist/99oview/tab2O2.pdf (visited Aug. 30, 2001).
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D. Opinio Juris
Those involved with refugee return know it to be tremendously
complex and not subject to simple cause-effect generalizations. Still,
whether a refugee's country of origin is willing or not to accept return is
a condition precedent.12  Are the forty-two states listed above
acquiescing to the return of their refugees because they feel a legal
obligation? Are those four states that resist return doing so because
they feel no obligation to allow it? Or, do those states excuse
themselves, indicating they feel an obligation, but are immune for some
specific reason(s)? The following discussion examines these questions,
beginning with four situations where return is occurring. Second, a
critical analysis is undertaken of the four countries where return is
possible, but stagnant.
1. Currently Repatriating Countries
This section provides a brief background on the salient refugee
issues in each situation, and then focuses on the receiving governments'
sense of opinio juris.
a) Afghanistan
UNHCR is assisting the repatriation of Afghanis from neighboring
Pakistan and Iran. 3 The repatriations are pursuant to a multi-lateral
agreement that foresees the voluntary return of 200,000 Afghan
refugees who fled Afghanistan's civil war."' Pakistan believes over 1.2
million Afghans currently reside in the country making the
"Afghans... the largest refugee group in the world." 8" Note that
Afghanistan is not a state party to any of the following conventions: the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; the Convention relating
to the Status of Stateless Persons; the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness. 6
82. Exception may be made for those situations where some larger power, say
NATO/KFOR in Kosovo, force the repatriating country to accept back its nationals. These
situations are beyond the scope of this paper except to the extent the host country's
unwillingness to accept the return is evidence of contrary state practice.
83. UNHCR Suspends Repatriation of Afghans to Kandahar, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Apr. 7, 2000.
84. Id. On April 7, 2000, the repatriation effort was temporarily suspended when
Taliban soldiers raided UNHCR's office.
85. Nadeem Yaqub, Repatriation Starts Up After Bitter Winter, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Mar. 30, 2000.
86. UNHCR homepage, at http://www.unhcr.chlrefworld/country/cdr/cdrafg02.htm#
Toc449943969 (visited April 12, 2000) (citing an unnamed United Nations report of 26
October 1998).
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The Taliban regime recognizes only the validity of Islamic law7 and
does not accept the notion of secular law, nor binding international
human rights norms.88 It offered the proof to argue the regime was not
intolerant of those with religious differences, attempting to bolster its
damaged human rights image. By the close of 1999, UNHCR had
recorded 446,200 returnees.8  Despite its strict religious code,
Afghanistan is properly characterized as a country that feels an
international obligation to repatriate refugees.
b) Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia is a party to all the major Human rights instruments and
protocols.' That notwithstanding, refugees returning to Bosnia do so at
least in part under the auspices of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. 1
Indeed, refugee return was at that agreement's forefront:
Article 1 Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons
1. All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to
their homes of origin... The early return of refugees and displaced
persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the
return of such persons who have left their territory, including those
who have been accorded temporary protection by third countries.9
Thus, party signatories undertook the obligation to receive back all
refugees. The agreement has the status of "Treaty"; binding under
international law.
Return is taking place in Bosnia, although the process has been
anything but smooth. At its best, repatriation occurs quietly, over a
period of weeks or months.93 A returning family repairs its looted or
burned-out house and slowly begins life anew. At its worst, a refugee
family attempts to return to an area where it is a minority, and a
refugee family belonging to the ethnic majority occupies the house.
Violent conflict erupts as the families and their supporters clash. Local
police do little and frequently use the clashes to justify halting the
return process. The NATO troops are ill equipped to intervene, as are
87. UNHCR country report, at www.unhcr.ch/world/mide/afghan.htm
88. Id. Note, however, that Afghanistan is still considered party to the ICCPR, the
CESCR and even CEDAW, among others, by accession.
89. UNHCR country report, at www.unhcr.ch/world/mide/afghan.htm.
90. UNHCR country report, at www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/seo/bosnia.htm
91. Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex 7, Article 1 (1995)
92. Id.
93. This observation, and those that follow in this section, are the personal
experience of the author who spent four years in former Yugoslavia between 1994-1998
and returned there in 2000.
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the various international organizations. The families occupying the
returnee's home often argue they will stay in the home until their own
homes, in whatever other region of Bosnia from where they fled, are
available for occupancy. A logjam exists where no one can return until
everyone returns. Many refugees give up."
By summer of 2000 that situation had begun to change. According
to international sources in the area, property legislation passed by the
respective parliaments and changes in the political leadership have
expedited the process.9 5 No longer is the question whether a refugee
will be allowed to return, but when. The obligations accepted by the
country's leadership at the time of the Dayton Agreement are finally
taking hold.
c) Croatia
Like Bosnia, Croatia is also a party to all the major human rights
instruments.9 Signing them was a precondition to recognition in
1992."7 The largest portion of refugees from Croatia are Serbs who fled
in 1995 during two Croatian government offensives. The offensives
took control of regions formerly under the de facto control of a Serb
entity.98 The World Refugee Survey estimates the number that fled in
1995 is 200,000,99 while during the course of the entire war over 300,000
fled Croatia."W
Despite his signature, former Croatian President Tudjman never
accepted the Dayton Accords as binding upon Croatia and returns to
the country have been slow.10' In 1999, however, the Croatian
parliament "adopted a number of measures.., indicating a lifting of
legal barriers to return. " 1°2 Croatia took these steps to avoid a "threat of
94. For a thorough examination of this conundrum and the International
Community's inadequate answer, see Waters supra note 12.
95. This information is based upon the author's several in-country interviews with
members of the OSCE and the Ombudsman's Office and NGOs during the summer of
2000.
96. See www.unhcr.ch/world/euro/seo/croatia.htm (visited Sept. 27, 2000).
97. EC Recognition Of Croatia Stirs Anger In Serbia, L.A. TIMES at 13, Dec. 18, 1991.
98. Serbs in the region called it "Republika Srbska Krajina" while the Croats referred
to it as "the occupied territories."
99. World Refugee Survey 1999, U.S. Committee for Refugees, p. 185 [hereinafter
Refugee Survey].
100. Id. (placing the number at 330,000) (a separate table in the book, p. 5 t.4, uses the
number 309,000 but notes that the estimates vary widely). See also UNHCR by Numbers,
at http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/table3.htm (last visited April 25, 2000)
(estimating 340,000 refugees fled Croatia).
101. See Bosnia: Serb refugee group demands speedier repatriation to Croatia, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 4, 2000.
102. Refugee Survey, supra note 99, at 185.
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
international sanctions . . ."3 that resulted after repeated diplomatic
interventions failed to convince that government to allow repatriation.
After the death of President Tudjman in 2000, elections ushered in
a new center-left government." Almost immediately an agreement
emerged between the Croatian government and the Bosnian Serb
government focusing on refugee repatriation."' The agreement contains
liberal return measures, including immediate repatriations of some
2,000 mostly Serb refugees. The text of the agreement is significant:
It is confirmed that the right to one's own home and protection of
property, as well as the right to return to one's home, are every man's
basic rights. These rights are defined by relevant international
conventions, the General Peace Accord Framework, as well as by the
constitutions of Croatia, the Serb Republic and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
That a document with this language is signed by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Croatia, and the President of the Bosnian Serb
entity, with United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also
present, indicates the signatories are aware of international (human
rights) obligations. At the time of this writing it remains unclear
whether the new Croatian government will actually bolster Serb
returns to Croatia. Of course, not all of the 300,000 Serb refugees have
sought to return. By 1999, the "Program of Return" mechanism created
by the Croatian Government had received only 97,000 applications. 7
The language in the above agreement and the "Program of Return" are
indicative of Croatia's sense of obligation to repatriate its refugees.
d) Liberia
Liberia is a party to all of the major human rights instruments,
though mostly by secession or accession. 8 Its refugee problems began
in 1989 during a civil war between current President Charles Taylor,
then dictator Samuel Doe, and several other factional leaders. The
fighting decimated the country, and nearly 500,000 Liberians fled into
103. Refugee Survey, supra note 99,. at 185.
104. Yugoslav Minister, UNHCR Discuss Refugees From Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 22, 2000 ("Ogata said that UNHCR was resolved to
continue cooperation with relevant Yugoslav state bodies in offering assistance to the
country, voicing hope that the newly-appointed Croatian government would improve
conditions for the return of refugees to Croatia.").
105. Thursday Bosnian Serbs, Croatia Sign Statement on Return of Refugees, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 9, 2000.
106. See Appendix 2 for full text of agreement.
107. UNHCR statistics on returns, available at http://www.unhcr.cb/refworldrefbib/
refstat1998/98tab02.htm
108. UNHCR homepage, at www.unhcr.chlworld/afriliberia.htm (visited Sept. 27,
2000).
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neighboring countries." 9 The war ended in 1996 and by July of 1997,
legislative and presidential elections were held for the first time since
1985.
At the UN in 1996, the Liberian representative, Mr. Bull,
addressed the Security Council and requested "Resources ... for
voluntary repatriation."" ' The UN responded, and in 1997 the General
Assembly reported, "the voluntary repatriation operations will take
place within the framework of the Abuja Peace Settlement, and in
accordance with the established timetable of activities.""' UNHCR
began assisting with voluntary repatriation almost immediately. "[The]
Repatriation and Reintegration program for Liberians has assisted the
return of over 120,000 refugees to their communities of origin since
1997.""' UNHCR also reported that some 183,537 other Liberian
refugees "spontaneously returned home from countries in the sub-
region either entirely on their own or with only minimal assistance
from the UNHCR."1" In December of 1999, the remaining several
hundred refugees returned as UNHCR began closing down its
114
operations.
Like many voluntary repatriations, the peace agreement hailed its
initiation. Press reports vary on the level of Liberian government
involvement in repatriation saying the government is hailing the
return, while failing to lift a finger in assistance."5 In February 1999, a
senior Liberian parliamentarian called on those refugees in the Ivory
Coast to return home, but he also warned "they should not expect
support from the Government due to its financial problems.""6
The Liberian government responded positively to return, although
it remains unclear whether they did so out of a sense of legal obligation.
They did not hinder the return and at least some of their
representatives called for its occurrence.
2. Non-Repatriating Countries
This section examines the rationales offered by the four
109. 51,000 Liberian Refugees Return Home, Says UNHCR, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, June 29, 1998.
110. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3757 (1997).
111. U.N. Doc EC/47/SC/CRP.37 (1997).
112. UNHCR country Index, at http://www.unhcr.ch/worldlafri/liberia.htm (visited
Apr. 18, 2000).
113. DEUTSCHE PRESS, supra note 100 (citing UNHCR press conference of the same
date).
114. Peter Kahler, Liberia; Hundreds Of Liberians Returning as UNHCR Decline
Nears, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, INC., Dec. 9, 1999.
115. See also J. Kpanneh Doe, Liberian Refugees: A Nation In Exile, AFRICA NEWS
SERVICE, Jul. 29, 1999.
116. Id.
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governments that have not allowed their refugee nationals to
repatriate. A proper rendering of this subject is considerably difficult
due to the sensitive, even covert, nature of a state's failure to repatriate.
The difference between what a government says and what it actually
does is perhaps nowhere more stark, but the fact that a state seeks to
hide or justify its failure to repatriate is also evidence of a sense of legal
obligation, just an obligation the country seeks to avoid. A country that
feels no obligation would not seek to excuse its behavior.
a) Bhutan
The situation in Bhutan was not one of "armed conflict" from which
the 125,000 refugees fled. Rather, it was forced exile at the hands of
the Bhutanese government beginning in 1989. The Bhutanese
government triggered the exodus of the mostly Hindu Bhutanese
citizens of ethnic Nepali origin when it enacted a new citizenship law
and enforced a citizenship code based on Buddhist values."7 The bulk of
the refugees now live in camps in Nepal and actively seek return.
Nepal and Bhutan have held seven rounds of ministerial talks but
failed to reach agreement." 9 Even the entry of Sadako Ogata in late
1999 offering a compromise position failed to garner bilateral support.1
20
UNHCR remains actively engaged and Nepal appears quite prepared to
have the refugees return, but Bhutan is clearly dragging its feet.
Explanations from the Kingdom of Bhutan's government are not
readily accessible. Their new citizenship law contains a provision to the
effect that "once a Bhutanese citizen leaves Bhutan, he or she
automatically forfeits the right to return,"2 ' a position wholly at odds
with the substantial body of human rights instruments cited above.
Another explanation blamed lack of repatriation on frequent changes in
the Nepali government. 2  Perhaps the most accurate justification for
lack of repatriation is that Bhutan seeks to limit those that can return
to refugees of "genuine Bhutanese origin."23 In such case Bhutan
violates the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
117. Binod Bhattarai, Refugee Talks Deadlocked, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1999. Among
other things the laws banned Nepalese dress and language in Bhutanese schools. See
Nepal and Bhutan to Resume Talks on Repatriating Bhutanese Refugees, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESS, May 11, 2000.
118. Bhutanese Group To Organize Mass Return Of Refugees To Bhutan, THE XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY, June 8, 1999.
119. Id.
120. See Bhutan Rejects Formula For Repatriation Of Refugees From Nepal, BBC
WORLDWIDE MONITORING.
121. Nepal, Bhutan Talks on Refugees End Without Progress, ASIAN POLITICAL NEWS,
September 20, 1999.
122. UNHCR Country Report, Nepal, at http://www.unhcr.ch/world/asia/nepal.htm
(visited Dec. 27, 2000).
123. See Bhutanese Group, supra note 118.
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of Racial Discrimination." The authorities in Bhutan have apparently
begun resettling Buddhists on the land that the refugees in Nepal and
India left behind.'
b) Israel 1
26
Palestinians fled Israel on at least two occasions, first in 1948 when
the State of Israel was created, and again in 1967, during the Arab-
Israeli war.' The earlier exodus was a result of militia-like fighting
between bands of Jews and Palestinians anticipating the UN partition
of Palestine.' The latter exodus displaced approximately 350,000
Palestinians from the West Bank of the Jordon River and the southerly
"Gaza Strip." While Israel denied causing this exodus, United States
State Department information suggests that both bombings and
loudspeaker campaigns expedited the departure.'29  Israel allowed
14,000 of these refugees to return when the war ended."'
Also in 1948, The UNGA passed Resolution 194 calling for the
return of Palestinians to their homes.13 ' The Assembly sent a
conciliation commission to facilitate the return, but the move failed.
The UN has since continually pressed for the return of Palestinians, 2
and annually reaffirms Resolution 194. s3 Regarding the 1967 war,
Security Council Resolution 237 "urged" Israel to "facilitate the return
without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the
outbreak of hostilities."34
Israel cites security concerns as its main objection to the
repatriation given the large numbers of displaced, now estimated at
1 ,5 00,0 00.135  The Israeli government uses this threat to avoid
compliance with human rights instruments. In fact, when Israel
ratified the ICCPR, it sent a formal declaration to the UN declaring
itself in a constant "State of Emergency." The status allowed it to
124. See supra text accompanying note 93. Bhutan signed the document in 1973 but
has not ratified it. See httpJ/www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (visited Dec. 20, 2000).
125. From United States Committee for Refugees, Country Report for Bhutan,
available at http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/scasia/bhutan.htm (visited Nov. 30,
2000).
126. At the time of this writing, hostilities in Israel have re-erupted making any
return impossible. Still, the analysis is helpful in understanding reasons a country
disallows repatriation.
127. See Quigley, supra note 12, at 173.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 181-82.
130. Id. at 184.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 183-84. See also U.N. Doc. A/Res/3236 (1974); U.N. Doc. E/1987/18 (1987).
133. Quigley, supra note 12, at 190.
134. U.N. Doc. S/Res/237 (1967).
135. Quigley, supra note 12, at 200.
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
derogate from "right to entry" obligations that would arise under the
human rights regime. Note that the very question of whether
Palestinians fit the definition of refugee is hotly contested.
c) Western Sahara
Approximately 110,000 Western Saharan people, ethnically
Sahrawi, were refugees in Algeria at the end of 1999.136 They fled
fighting between their political arm, the Polisario, and Moroccan and
Mauritanian forces, all of which asserted control over Western Saharan
territory.3 7 A United Nations peacekeeping force monitors the tenuous
cease-fire between the two parties, "and ... supervise[s] preparations
for the scheduled 1992 referendum."38 The referendum, still pending,
will purportedly decide whether Western Sahara will join Morocco or
remain a separate country. The sticking point is over who will be
allowed to vote. "The Polisario and many international observers
charged that Moroccan leaders were attempting to pad the voter list
with non-Sahrawis to tilt the referendum in Morocco's favor .... By
year's end, UN officials announced that continued disagreements over
voter eligibility would likely delay the referendum until 2002."'39
No Sahrawi refugees repatriated during 1999, although they are
prepared. The UN Security Council has encouraged the parties "to
move ahead with the necessary discussions" to repatriate
refugees."'Moreover, Morocco recently officially recognized the UNHCR
as having a legitimate agenda in the area, a step that will undoubtedly
bolster the prospects of voluntary repatriation. Additional steps in
advance of repatriation have also been taken including assessment
visits and pre-registration.""
There are three primary obstacles to return at this point. First, the
area from which the Sahrawis fled is controlled by Morocco, which is
hostile to return. Indeed, the Moroccans have settled some 100,000 of
their own citizens in the region in addition to planting landmines along
a makeshift line in the sand.42 Second, in similar vein to the voter list
136. United States Committee for Refugees website, Country Report for Western
Sahara, available at http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/western-sahara.htm
(visited Nov. 30, 2000).
137. Id. Mauritania eventually renounced its bid for control, while Morocco continues
to assert the claim.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Andrew Borowiec, North African Unity Hobbled by Fight Over Strip of Sand,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000. This writer also suggests Morocco's foot-dragging is because
it knows it will not only lose the election, but thereby also lose control of the mineral
riches said to be buried under the rocks of Western Sahara.
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dispute, exactly who is eligible to return has not been determined.
These first two reasons have fostered the third reason pointed out in
testimony to the House International Relations Committee:
The parties have not come to an agreement regarding the draft
refugee repatriation protocol presented by the UN High Commission for
Refugees. Without formal authorization from the Government of
Morocco, and cooperation from the POLISARIO and Algeria (the latter
as host country to the refugees), the UNHCR cannot proceed with
refugee repatriation.4 '
In short, UNHCR has been unsuccessful in garnering a
multilateral agreement. While no party suggests that refugees do not
have the right to return or that they should be stopped from doing so, it
is Morocco that has the most to lose. A loss in the referendum would
not only force Morocco to give up mineral rich territory, it would also
force an uprooting of the new settlers.
d) Kenya
Refugees from northern Kenya fled into Ethiopia in 1993 escaping
localized, inter-ethnic fighting.'" While some have returned, UNHCR's
plans to repatriate the remaining 5,000 were halted by Kenyan
authorities in 1999.'45 "Government officials questioned whether the
refugees were Kenyan citizens and complained that Ethiopian officials
had prevented Kenyan authorities from inspecting the refugees' camp
in southern Ethiopia."'46 In addition to the government's citizenship
concerns, ethnic tensions in the region are still high.
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3. Conclusions
The UN is engaged with at least forty-six countries from which
substantial numbers of refugees have fled. Of those, forty-two countries
are currently involved with repatriation, some subject to the ebbs and
flows of conflict. The countries repatriate only upon prodding by
UNHCR and the host country, but generally recognize their obligation
to do so. When agreements are struck, the text normally acknowledges
the obligation or at least the right of return.
Israel, Bhutan, Kenya and Western Sahara are the four countries
143. Allen L. Keiswetter testifying, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional
Testimony, House International Relations Committee, Sept. 13, 2000.
144. See Horace Awori, Horn Of Africa: Kenyans Join Cross-Border Movement, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jul. 2, 1993.
145. United States Committee for Refugees, Country Report for Kenya, at
http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/africa/kenya.htm (visited Dec. 20, 2000).
146. Id.
147. Id.
2001
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
in the world where stability reigns, yet refugees are not returning.
Bhutan seeks to justify nonrepatriation by blaming Nepal or citing
discriminatory legal provisions. To the extent it relies on the latter,
Bhutan violates the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination." In Western Sahara, Morocco is seeking to maintain
control of mineral-rich territory by keeping the security situation
tenuous for refugee Sahrawis. Israel cites a recognized exception to the
obligation, the invocation of "public order" or "national security"
concerns. 149 Israel also contests whether or not the Palestinians fit the
definition of refugee in the Convention. Kenya bases its delay of
repatriation in citizenship disputes. In every case analyzed, the non-
repatriating government seeks to justify its inaction. Research revealed
no instance where a country did not at least attempt to explain away its
failure to allow return. This evidence is strongly suggestive of opinio
juris sive necessatatis.
E. Of Norm Creating Character
Emerging principles of Customary International Law must be of
"norm creating character," according to the International Court of
Justice, meaning they "could be regarded as forming the basis of a
general rule of law."150 Considering potential norms, the ICJ questions
any "unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope" of a
norm as well as its prominence in agreements and conventions." Is the
practice considered optional, an equal choice among others? Or is the
obligation fixed and consistent? Finally, may states derogate or make
reservations?
1. Meaning and scope
"Repatriation" is relatively clear in definition,'52 while the adjective
"voluntary" is more troublesome. Webster's Dictionary defines
voluntary as, "performed ... of one's own free will," "without
obligation," and "choice." 3 The "UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary
Repatriation" defines it in the negative, "the absence of measures which
push the refugee to repatriate."" Voluntary repatriation for the
148. See supra text accompanying note 124. Bhutan signed the document in 1973 but
has not ratified it. See http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (visited Dec. 20, 2000).
149. Rebus Sic Stantibus situations offer yet another avenue of research. To what
extent is it relevant that today's state (Israel) is not the one the refugee's left?
150. North Sea, supra note 65, at 41-42 para. 72 (1969) (failing to find the
equidistant principle" as "norm-creating").
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying note 1.
153. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2564 (3d ed. 1993).
154. UNHCR HANDBOOK ON VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION, §§ 2.2, 2.3. (1996). May
pushing take various forms? Are economic incentives from the International Community
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purposes of this discussion presupposes the refugee actually desires to
return when conditions allow. 55 Thus, voluntary repatriation occurs
when an individual, who fled from his country of origin under
conditions making him or her a refugee, chooses from free will and
without coercion, to return to his or her country of origin.5 6
Difficulties in defining the norm's scope emerge when a country
attempts to exclude individuals or categories of refugees. The scope
cannot be so broad as to force a country to accept back any and all who
fled, simply because they are refugees. Acknowledging limited,
legitimate exceptions to the scope does not undermine the overall effect
of the emerging norm. In fact, recognizing exceptions allows the
International Community to identify countries seeking to exclude
refugees not fitting under any exception.
This author suggests the following two exceptions:
Individuals, the return of which will clearly provoke violence
beyond the control of the local civilian authority.
Individuals who have declared their intention not to follow the laws
or respect the constitution of the country of origin,"7 provided that those
laws or constitutions are in accord with international norms.
Excluded from the list of exceptions are criminals, including war
criminals, and those who have committed terrorist acts. The country of
origin has the right, if not the obligation, to arrest upon return, those it
believes have committed illegal acts. That arrest is subject to the
norms of the international human rights regime. Under this rubric,
countries refusing to repatriate such individuals violate the law of
nations. 15'
2. The Norm's Preeminence
Before the 1970's, no discernible hierarchy existed within the
UNHCR between the three durable solutions for refugees.5 ' UNHCR
worked for resettlement and integration under the presumption that
a push to repatriate? What about the termination of refugee status? The Handbook
leaves these questions unanswered.
155. This paper's focus is on the obligation of the country of origin, not on the refugee's
choices. A discussion of what conditions might give rise to the choice, or who is the body
competent to decide is beyond the scope of this paper.
156. Also beyond scope is the debate about whether "return" means return to the
refugee's actual home (building, or town), or simply to the borders of the country.
157. Remember the Magna Carta contained the exception, "saving his allegiance to
us." See supra text accompanying note 17.
158. This position assumes that all of the other elements of CIL are satisfied with
respect to voluntary repatriation.
159. See ZEICK, supra note 4, at 81. The three "solutions" being resettlement,
voluntary repatriation, and local integration.
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return of post-World War II refugees was impractical. But emerging in
the 1970's and without question since the mid-1980's, voluntary
repatriation has become the preferred and primary solution for
refugees. 6 ' Certainly that is UNHCR's position:
Voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement, that is,
the traditional solutions for refugees, all remain viable and important
responses to refugee situations, even while voluntary repatriation is the
pre-eminent solution. 6'
UNHCR also believes voluntary repatriation is the "best
solution." 62 In 1983, the High Commissioner's office "[e]mphasiz[ed]
that voluntary repatriation is the most desirable and durable solution
to problems of refugees and displaced persons.... ,163 Joan Fitzpatrick,
refugee law expert at the University of Washington Law School,
believes that "[violuntary repatriation at the cessation of conflict is seen
as the ideal solution for massive flows of victims of armed conflict,
whether the events occur in Rwanda or Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
regardless of how distant resolution of the conflict may be."" Over
sixty UN resolutions, declarations and reports call for voluntary
repatriation as the solution to refugee problems. 6
3. Optional or Obligatory
Apart from the well-recognized obligations under current human
rights law, no codified obligations exist requiring countries to permit
the voluntary repatriation of their refugees. That notwithstanding,
some regional instruments do so require. For example, the 1969
Organization of African Unity Convention on the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa provides in Article V.1 that "the essentially
voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all
160. See ZEICK, supra note 4, at 81. The three "solutions" being resettlement,
voluntary repatriation, and local integration..
161. Report of the 49th Session of the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme, Report on the Work of the Standing Committee, U.N. GAOR,
49th Sess., para. 21 (gg); U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/911(1998), reprinted at http://www.unhcr.chl
refworld/unhcr/excomlreports/911.htm (visited May 17, 2000). See also ZEICK, supra note
4, at 81.
162. See "Opening Statement by the High Commissioner to the 44 1h Session of
UNHCR's Executive Committee" (1993). See also Conclusion no. 18(XXXI) of the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme, reprinted in UNHCR Doc.
HCR/IP.2/REV.1982 (1982) at 39-40; Report of the UNHCR to the Economic and Social
Council, UN Doc. E/1985/62 (1985) at 16-17.
163. UN Doc. A/Res/38/121 (1983).
164. Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight From Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary "Refuge" and
Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 13 (1994).
165. Search for terms "voluntary repatriation" in UN database, "Access UN." Most are
included in Appendix 1.
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cases ... ",166 That principle echoes those that the Afro-Asian Legal
Consultative Committee proffered in the 1960's.
16 7
A more significant source of obligation exists in a state's own law.
Discussing whether a CIL obligation exists to admit aliens, one author
found that, "[g]enerally, the [municipal] laws accommodate specific
categories of aliens besides affirming a state's duty to readmit its own
nationals."6 8 In the United States, citizens cannot leave or enter
without a passport 169 and can only receive a passport if they "owe
allegiance,"17' but are otherwise unrestricted.1
7
'
4. The Effect of Derogation and Exception
The ICCPR's derogation clause is strictly limited to those "public
emergenc[ies] which threaten the life of the nation" and which are
"officially proclaimed."'7 Similarly, albeit less stringent, the UNDHR
allows the rights to be limited as "determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." No
mention is made of refugees and a plain reading of the instruments
leaves no room for the position that refugees should be treated
differently.
Still, states prohibiting refugee return may invoke "national
security" or "public order" clauses should they legitimately believe the
return is threatening.'74 But by invoking the derogation clauses, the
state tacitly acknowledges an obligation to repatriate in the absence of
those conditions. A state declaring that it need not permit a refugee
166. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept.
10, 1969, art. IV, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 8 I.L.M. 1288
167. See "Principles Concerning Treatment of Refugees," supra text accompanying
note 54.
168. James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission Of Aliens Under International Law,
77 A.J.I.L. 804, 833 (1983).
169. 8 USC § 1185(b) (2001) ("Except as otherwise provided by the President and
subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe,
it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or
attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States
passport.").
170. 22 USC § 212 (2001). ("No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for
any other persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United
States.")
171. Further analysis of domestic legislation in other countries, not undertaken here,
would substantiate an emerging CIL norm to the extent it binds those countries to accept
back nationals seeking to enter.
172. ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 4(1)
173. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 29(2).
174. E.g. Israel. See Quigley, supra note 12, at 199-200.
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entry is materially different from a state declaring it would permit
entry were it not for security concerns.
Israel provides the well-known case-in-point. Commentators
defending the Israeli government's refusal to repatriate the
Palestinians regularly invoke the derogation clauses of applicable
Human rights instruments, 7 ' the Universal Declaration in Article 29
and the ICCPR in Article 4(1),176 respectively. When Israel ratified the
ICCPR, it formally communicated its state of emergency to the UN.
17
Whether the situation in Israel is properly categorized under a
derogation clause is beyond the scope of this paper. But assuming,
arguendo, that such a situation applies in a state, does that weaken the
proposal that voluntary repatriation is CIL? The answer is no for two
reasons. First, derogations permitted by international human rights
instruments do not apply to customary norms unless they happen to
coincide; the regimes are necessarily different. Second, exceptions exist
under CIL norms as well. The author proposed two above, both of
which happen to coincide with the human rights derogations.7 ' The
reason being that similar sovereignty and policy considerations
underlying the human rights derogations can and should also apply to
this emerging CIL norm. No state should be required to take
affirmative steps certain to threaten its very existence. In practice,
invoking these exceptions will be rare because the norm only requires
repatriation upon the achievement of stability within a country. Thus,
a "national emergency" allowing derogation under ICCPR would also be
a sufficient lack of the stability necessary to invoke the CIL norm of
voluntary repatriation.
But what if it is exactly the return of specific refugees that causes
the instability or national emergency? The Universal Declaration
would allow an abridgement of its Article 13(2) where the return
threatens the "rights and freedoms of others" or "morality, public order
and the general welfare."'79 Similarly, under the exceptions proffered
above, the state would not be required under CIL to repatriate when
the return would provoke violence beyond the control of local authority.
Significantly, the CIL norm does not permit exclusion of refugees that
threaten "morality," or "general welfare," so long as such a threat is
controllable.
175. Quigley, supra note 12, at 199-200.
176. See ICCPR, supra note 8.
177. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, at 142, U.N. Doc.
ST/Leg/Ser.E/14 (1996) (Israel's declaration of Oct. 3, 1991).
178. See supra text Section III.E.1.
179. See Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 13(2).
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F. Passage of Sufficient Time'
Some authors suggest that in the modem era, the "speed of
normative change has accelerated substantially."'8 ' The Restatement
cited above notes that "[tihe practice necessary to create customary law
may be of comparatively short duration.... "1 8 ' The ICJ remarked on
the parameters of this requirement in the North Sea case:
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily,
or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law,... an indispensable requirement would be that
within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the
provision invoked...183
The ICJ held that the equidistant principle's brief ten-year history,
combined with meager state practice, did not arise to CIL.'84
For the principle of voluntary repatriation, tolling the passage of
time could begin with the Magna Carta's first formalized obligation
upon a government to allow re-entry. 8' But did the drafters intend the
Magna Carta to apply to refugees? Such a conclusion is not
inappropriate given that the only qualification of the right written into
the document was the returnee's "allegiance."' 8 Shortly after the
signing of the Havana Convention Regarding the Status of Aliens noted
earlier, 87 Sir Robert Jennings observed that while "prima facie the
treatment accorded by a state to its own subjects... is a matter of
purely domestic concern," the subject may have CIL implications when
a state is "willful[ly] flooding other states with refugees." 8 "The
evasion of the duty of a state to receive back its own nationals," can
harm the "material interests of third states," thus invoking CIL.'89
While not spoken of in terms of "voluntary repatriation," Sir Jennings
recognized that states may have a "duty" to accept back their refugees,
or they risk violating customary norms. 9°
The terms "voluntary repatriation" emerged in formal UN
180. North Sea, supra note 65, para. 74.
181. See, e.g., Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 909 (1998).
182. See Restatement, supra text accompanying note 60.
183. North Sea supra note 65, para. 74.
184. Id. para. 81.
185. See supra text accompanying note 19.
186. See Magna Carta, supra note 17.
187. See supra text accompanying note 18.
188. ZIECK, supra note 4, at 21.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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documents in 1948."' In 1980, the Executive Committee of the UNHCR
concluded that "voluntary repatriation ... reflect[ed] international law
and general international practice,"1 'thus accepting the Executive
Committee's observation as true means considering the twenty years
since as the proper measure of time passage. 193 If in 1980 voluntary
repatriation was "general international practice," have the twenty years
since seen the norm become "both extensive and virtually uniform?"
194
Certainly the "state practice" analysis above supports the conclusion.
Virtually every state achieving a stable peace, and that had refugees
awaiting return, allowed the return or sought to excuse itself.
Exceptions to this rule are not of significant number. In sum, the
"passage of sufficient time" element of CIL formation does not preclude
a finding that "voluntary repatriation" has become a customary norm.
IV. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
The discussion above applied the elements of customary
international law to the norm, "voluntary repatriation of refugees." It
set forth the position that this norm is indeed emerging as a binding
legal principle upon countries that have experienced refugee outflows
during conflict. The norm is not contingent upon human rights
instruments but is supported by them. "State practice" indicates that
over ninety-percent of all countries fitting the criteria accept back their
refugee nationals. Minor exceptions to this obligation, based on
sovereignty and paralleling derogations recognized in human rights
law, operate to define the norm's scope and allow the international
community to assess compliance. Certainly there exist countries fitting
the criteria that currently do not allow voluntary repatriation, but
virtually all seek to justify their failure to return. Whether the excuses
fit into the exceptions proffered herein is debatable, but the mere act of
191. UNHCR Mission Statement, supra note 5.
192. Executive Committee Of The High Commissioner's Programme, Sub-Committee
Of The Whole On International Protection, Thirty-sixth session, 1 August 1985,
Voluntary Repatriation, EC/SCP/4 para. 40 ("The Round Table reaffirmed the significance
of the 1980 Executive Committee Conclusion on Voluntary Repatriation as reflecting
international law and general international practice (Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI). It also
welcomed the provisions contained in the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 22
November 1984, which adopted fully the provisions of the Contadora Act on Peace and Co-
operation in Central America and affirmed the voluntary and individual character of
voluntary repatriation and the need for it to be carried out under conditions of absolute
safety and dignity, preferably to the refugee's place of residence in his country of origin.").
193. Auailable at http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/table2.htm (viewed March 25,
2000). Note also the UNHCR's comment on its web-page that "[t]he 1.9 million returnees
whom UNHCR currently helps are only a small fraction of the total number of refugees or
internally displaced persons who have returned to their place of origin since the creation
of UNHCR in 1951." UNHCR homepage, at http://www.unhcr.ch (last visited March 4,
2000).
194. See supra text accompanying note 184.
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justification lends support to the necessary finding of opiniojuris.
In addition to the CIL formation principles, hard law bolsters the
norm's status. States cannot discriminate on the basis of race or
ethnicity should they seek to exclude a returnee. And binding human
rights instruments contain a "right to enter" that has never been shown
inapplicable to refugees. The Geneva Conventions contain similar
principles. Finally, the recognized burden upon the host country to
provide for and protect the refugees invokes the binding principles of
interstate relations. Customary international law, subject to a few
exceptions, dictates that countries must allow the voluntary
repatriation of nationals who have fled their territory once a stable
peace reigns.
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APPENDIX 1
General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions on Repatriation
CountrySource
Afghanistan AIRES/53/165 (1999)
Azerbijan/Armenia S/RES/874 (1993)
Bosnia & A/53/PV.72 (1998)
Herzegovina
Burundi AIRES/50/159 (1996)
Cambodia S/RES/810 (1993)
Chad A/RES/44/153 (1990)
assist voluntary returnees
Congo, Dem. Rep. A/53/PV.95 (1999)
S/RES/1258 (1999)
Croatia AIRES/53/163 (1999)
East Timor S/RES/ /1272 (1999)
S/RES/ /1264 (1999)
El Salvador A/RES/48/117 (1994)
Ethiopia A/RES/49/174
Georgia (Abkhazia) S/RES/1255 (1999)
S/RES/1097
(delinking return and the underlying conflict)
Guatemala AIRES/48/117 (1994)
Guinea-Bissau S/RES/1233 (1999)
Iraq E/RES/1991/5 (1991)
Liberia AIRES/50/149
S/RES/1014 (1995)
S/RES/1100 (1997)
Myanmar A/RES/53/162 (1999)
Nicaragua A!RES/48/117 (1994)
Israel A/RES/49/35 (1995)
Rwanda A/RES/51/114
A/RES/50/200
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S/RES/1080 (1996)
Sierra Leone S/RES/1270 (1999)
Somalia A/RES/43/206 (1989)
South Africa A/RES/45/176 (1991)
A/RES/46/79 (1992)
Sudan A/RES/51/112 (1997) and A/RES/54/182 (2000)
Tajikistan A/RES/51/30 J (1997)
Togo A/AC.96/199 (1963)
Uganda AJRES/41/195 (1987)
Yugoslavia S/RES/1239 (1999) & A/S-21/PV.9 GA
(Kosovo)
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APPENDIX 2
The full text of the joint statement of the Croatian Foreign
Minister, Tonino Picula and the Bosnian Serb President, Milorad
Dodik:
"It is confirmed that the right to one's own home and protection of
property, as well as the right to return to one's home, are every man's
basic rights. These rights are defined by relevant international
conventions, the General Peace Accord Framework, as well as by the
constitutions of Croatia, the Serb Republic and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
"Furthermore, it is confirmed that the principle will be fully adhered to
under which the right of the rightful owner of a property has priority
over the right of the person currently in possession of or occupying that
property. Accordingly, a proposal will be submitted to the government
of Croatia and the Council of Ministers of Bosnia-Hercegovina to
conclude an agreement within three months providing for the return of
their citizens currently living as refugees in the other state. "Until the
above agreement is concluded, the relevant bodies in Croatia and the
Serb Republic entity will: - allow 2,000 persons from each side to return
to their homes within three months; - coordinate the procedure for the
return and reconstruction and take specific and urgent steps to make it
easier for those refugees seeking to return to their homes to recover
their property. These steps will, if necessary, include eviction and
alternative temporary accommodation; - take effective measures to
recover and vacate illegally occupied property; - exchange relevant data
about the pace of reconstruction of residential property and the return
of property to its rightful owners; - organize meetings between mayors
in target areas in order to find solutions at the local level, especially the
solutions relating to the implementation of the ruling of the Housing
Commission; - facilitate visits to the areas of return by potential
returnees and representatives of refugee associations; - gather requests
for return; - run a coordinated radio-TV campaign about the process of
cross-border return; - set up a mixed working group aimed at finding
lasting solutions for Croats from Bosnia-Hercegovina who have decided
to remain in Croatia, as well as for Serbs from Croatia who wish to
remain in the Serb Republic. The above-mentioned working group will
also organize working meetings every two months between the
institutions responsible for return and reconstruction, alternating
between Zagreb and Banja Luka.The meetings will discuss unresolved
cases, as well as ways to remove obstacles to return. The mixed
working group will also include in its work representatives of refugee
associations from Croatia and the Serb Republic, as well as UNHCR
representatives; - prepare joint proposals for projects within the
framework of the Stability Pact, including the reconstruction of housing
and infrastructure aimed at improving cross-border return. Serb
Republic Prime Minister Dodik and Croatian Foreign Minister Picula
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also agreed that the competent institutions of Croatia and the Serb
Republic entity would: - encourage the development of economic
cooperation and remove obstacles which prevent a harmoniuos
development and widening of that cooperation in keeping with free-
market principles;- endevour to normalize payment transactions
through competent financial institutions, as a basic condition for
developing significant trade and overall economic cooperation; - in
accordance with the signed agreement on the border between Croatia
and Bosnia-Hercegovina, to continue to solve outstanding problems in
good faith; take measures to facilitate the free and safe movement of
people and goods; make special efforts to open border crossings and
allow passenger traffic; re-establish river transport; restore navigability
of the Sava river and regulate cross-border rail traffic until an
interstate treaty between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina is concluded.

